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FOR THE APPLICATION (OR LACK THEREOF) OF THE INTERNAL
AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
Christian M. Craddock
I. INTRODUCTION
In the mid 1990s, Tennessee began experiencing a boom in the construction of
assisted living facilities.1 ARC Lifemed, Inc. (“ARC”) was a large company that for
many years had been a leader in the construction of nursing home facilities in the
eastern and southeastern regions of the United States.2 ARC wished to enter the
assisted living facility market, and in 1997, it embarked upon a business plan with the
ultimate goal of opening forty assisted living facilities.3 By the fall of 1998, ARC had
twenty assisted living facilities built and in operation.4
Despite having no prior experience managing assisted living facilities, LifeTrust,
Inc. (“LifeTrust”), a company created in 1996, owned and operated thirty assisted
living facilities by the end of 1998.5 LifeTrust began contemplating ways to increase
the revenues generated by assisted living facilities through means other than merely
providing residents with room and board.6 Believing that it could obtain increased
revenues by entering the pharmacy market, LifeTrust began discussions regarding
entering into “a joint venture with ‘The Pharmacy,’ an institutional pharmacy serving
skilled nursing facilities and assisted living facilities primarily in Tennessee.”7 Shortly
thereafter, American Medserve Corporation acquired The Pharmacy, which was

See ARC Lifemed, Inc. v. AMC-Tennessee, Inc., No. M2003-02640-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 460, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2005).
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Id. at *2-3.
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Id. at *3.
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Id. The Pharmacy, owned and operated by Buddy Stephens, “had profitably concentrated its
business in the long-term care market.” Id.
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renamed AMC-TN.8 In 1997, LifeTrust and AMC-TN entered into a joint venture,
forming LifeMed, LLC (“LifeMed”)9 as a Delaware limited liability company
qualified to conduct business in Tennessee.10 LifeMed was established to operate as
a “pharmacy within a pharmacy,” running its operations out of AMC-TN’s facilities
and supplying pharmecutical supplies to LifeTrust’s assisted living facilities.11
ARC learned of LifeTrust’s and AMC-TN’s joint venture in 1997 while
searching for ways to increase its own revenues.12 ARC had prior experience
managing a pharmacy in Richmond, Virginia,13 and expressed an interest in joining
LifeMed as a member of the joint venture. ARC contributed $300,000 to LifeMed in
1998 and received a one-third ownership interest.14 According to LifeMed’s
Management Agreement, AMC-TN would manage the business’s daily operation.15
As manager, AMC was entitled to a management fee.16

8 Id. American Medserve Corporation itself was eventually acquired by Omnicare, Inc., “the leading
institutional pharmacy in the nation.” Id. at *3-4. Although ownership of the business changed for a
second time, the name AMC-TN was retained. Id. at *4.

Id. at *4. LifeTrust initially contributed $200,000 to the joint venture in exchange for a forty percent
ownership share. Id. AMC-TN contributed $300,000 to the joint venture and received a sixty percent
ownership share. Id.

9

Id. at *33. Both the plaintiff’s complaint and AMC-TN’s counter-complaint affirmatively asserted
that LifeMed was organized under the laws of Delaware. The Court of Appeals did not question
these assertions. Id. at *29, *33.

10

11 Id. at *4. The parties believed that the “pharmacy within a pharmacy” concept would allow
LifeMed to share overhead costs with AMC-TN and to utilize AMC-TN’s services without causing
the overcapitalization of LifeMed. Id.
12

Id.

13

Id. This pharmacy was used to serve ARC’s nursing home facilities. Id. at *11.

Id. at *4-5. Half of ARC’s $300,000 investment went to AMC-TN in the form of a distribution. Id.
at *5. Under the Amended and Restated LLC Agreement executed by ARC, LifeTrust, and AMCTN, each member could appoint two members of LifeMed’s Board of Directors; no member could
withdraw capital funds without the approval of all three members; and each member’s capital account
would be distributed upon termination of the LLC. Id. The Agreement further provided that any
member could withdraw from the venture “and receive a return of its positive capital account
balance.” Id. at *5-6.
14

Id. at *6. The Management Agreement stated in part that AMC-TN would provide “management,
consulting and advisory services to Owner in connection with the operation of the Pharmacy, and
15
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Although both ARC and AMC-TN had experience providing pharmaceutical
services to nursing homes, none of the members had experience providing these
services to assisted living facilities.17 Though all the members hoped that ARC’s and
AMC-TN’s experience in the nursing home pharmaceutical market would translate
easily into the assisted living facility pharmaceutical market, they would soon find
that this would not be the case.18 AMC-TN, member and managing partner of
LifeMed, supplied its pre-existing pharmaceutical clients with pharmaceutical
products separately from supplying those products to LifeMed.19 This practice
created inventory control problems because the two pharmacies were not physically
separated until early 2000.20 These inventory control problems, along with an
overestimation of the market for assisted living facilities, ultimately led to LifeMed’s
demise.21 On August 15, 2000, all three members agreed to dissolve LifeMed.22
From that point forward, the members’ relationship deteriorated to the point that,
on October 12, 2001, LifeTrust, ARC, and LifeMed “brought suit against AMCTN,…alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary relationship, negligent
representation and fraudulent misrepresentation.”23 AMC-TN countersued, claiming
that LifeMed owed it unpaid management fees under the Management Agreement.24
Relying on expert testimony, the trial court held that AMC-TN was liable to all

shall devote such time, expertise, and resources as may be appropriate to properly manage the
Pharmacy.” Id. at *7.
16 Id. at *9. This management fee was to be “equal to [AMC-TN]’s actual costs incurred in providing
the services to be performed by [AMC-TN under the Management Agreement], plus ten percent
(10%).” Id.
17

Id. at *11-12.

18

Id. at *12.
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Id. at *15-16.

20

Id. at *18-19.
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Id.
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Id. at *23.

23

Id.

24

Id. at *28-29.
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plaintiffs on all claims asserted.25 Additionally, the trial court dismissed AMC-TN’s
counterclaim.26
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in
part and reversed in part.27 The court noted that the fiduciary duty of a managermember of a Tennessee LLC is generally owed to the LLC itself, rather than to the
LLC’s individual members.28 However, a breach of a fiduciary duty constitutes a
breach of contract if the actions constituting the breach of duty also constitute
violations of the provisions of the LLC agreement or the management agreement.29
II. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE TENNESSEE LLC
In McGee v. Best,30 the Tennessee Court of Appeals recognized the principle
that in Tennessee, “there is no fiduciary duty between, or among, individual
members of a Limited Liability Corporation.”31 McGee, a founding member and
employee of an LLC, was terminated from his position as chief manager of the LLC,
and the remaining LLC members purchased his interest in the LLC pursuant to a
contractual purchase option.32 McGee brought suit against the remaining members
of the LLC, claiming that they had violated the LLC’s operating agreement and their
fiduciary duties to the LLC.33 The Court of Appeals concluded that, based on

25

Id. at *1-2.

26

Id.

27

Id. at *2.

28

Id. at *49 (quoting McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48, 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)).

29

Id. at *45.

30

106 S.W.3d 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

31

Id. at 63.

32

Id. at 51, 54.

33

Id. at 55. Specifically, McGee alleged
that the defendants violated the Operating Agreement, and the Tennessee Limited
Liability Act by purporting to terminate him without a meeting or the waiver of a
meeting…[and] that the defendants breached the agreement and their fiduciary
duty to the LLC and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by purporting to
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Tennessee statutory law, members of a Tennessee member-managed LLC have a
fiduciary duty to “account to the LLC” for any benefit received and to act as trustee of
any profits the member derives from any transaction to which the other members of
the LLC did not consent.34 The court found the statutory language important and
emphasized that courts should not discount the intent of the legislature as expressed
in the wording of the legislation itself.35 The court dismissed McGee’s cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty because it was clear that the legislature intended
for LLC members to owe a fiduciary duty only to the LLC itself and not to the other
members.36
The rule espoused by the McGee court—that members of a Tennessee LLC
owe a fiduciary duty to the LLC itself and not to its members—appears to be
contradicted by the ruling in Anderson v. Wilder.37 Similar to McGee, the plaintiff LLC
members were expelled from FuturePoint Administrative Services, LLC, by vote of
the other members.38 The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the defendants breached
the fiduciary duty they owed to the rest of the members.39 Applying principles of
Tennessee corporation law, the Tennessee Court of Appeals found that members
terminate his employment for ‘cause’ when no cause existed and by attempting to
acquire his membership interest, without having any right to do so.
Id.
34

Id. at *63-64 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-240-102 (2002)) (emphasis added).

McGee, 106 S.W.3d at 64; see also Worrall v. Kroger Co., 545 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tenn. 1977)
(providing that “legislative intent or purpose is to be ascertained primarily from the natural and
ordinary meaning of the language used, when read in the context of the entire statute, without any
forced or subtle construction to limit or extend the import of the language”); State ex rel. Rector v.
Wilkes, 436 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tenn. 1968) (providing that “[t]he prime purpose of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent and all rules of [statutory]
construction yield to achieve this end”); Mangrum v. Owens, 917 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995) (providing that “[t]he rule of statutory construction to which all others must yield is that the
intention of the legislature must prevail”); Plough, Inc. v. Premier Pneumatics, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 495,
498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (providing that “[t]he rule of statutory construction to which all others
must yield is that the intention of the legislature must prevail”).
35

36

McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48, 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

37

No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003).

38

Id. at *1.

39

Id. at *2.
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holding a majority interest in a Tennessee LLC owe fiduciary duties to holders of
minority interests in the LLC.40 The defendants argued that the court should follow
McGee and find that members of an LLC owe fiduciary duties only to the LLC and
not to other LLC members.41 The Anderson court rejected this argument, however,
distinguishing the McGee case by characterizing it as merely “an employment dispute”
not involving any “allegation of oppression by a majority shareholder group.”42
A. ARC Lifemed, Inc. v. AMC-Tennessee, Inc., and the Application of the Fiduciary
Duty of LLC Members to Other LLC Members
In ARC Lifemed, Inc. v. AMC-Tennessee, Inc.,43 the Tennessee Court of Appeals
ruled that AMC-TN owed no fiduciary duty to the other members of LifeMed, LLC,
thus reversing the ruling of the trial court that such duties existed and were breached
by AMC-TN.44 The ARC Lifemed court relied heavily on McGee in reaching its
conclusion.45 The ARC Lifemed court acknowledged the conflict between the McGee
and Anderson decisions.46 However, the Anderson court’s ruling was limited to those

Id. at *8-9. In so finding, the Tennessee Court of Appeals specifically referenced Nelson v. Martin,
958 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1997), a Tennessee Supreme Court case cited in the plaintiff’s brief. Id. at *8.
In Nelson, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that in the corporate context, “majority shareholders
owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders.” Nelson, 958 S.W.2d at 647; see also Mike v. Po Group,
Inc., 937 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tenn. 1996) (providing that “Tennessee courts have stated that majority
shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders”); Nelms v. Weaver, 681 S.W.2d 547, 549
(Tenn. 1984) (providing that majority stockholders have “a fiduciary relationship” with minority
stockholders); Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 208 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tenn. 1948) (providing that a
“controlling stockholder…owe[s] a fiduciary duty to other stockholder[s]”).
40

41

Anderson, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819, at *16.

Id. The Anderson court emphasized that the McGee court “noted that ‘this case boils down to a
rather uncomplicated dispute controlled by the employment contract and the Operating
Agreement[;]…[t]he only issue involved is whether termination of the employment was for cause.’”
Id. (quoting McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48, 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)).
42

43

No. M2003-02640-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2005).

44

Id. at *54.

45 See id. at *49-53. The ARC Lifemed court quoted extensively from McGee and took steps to closely
associate the case at bar with McGee. Id.
46

See id. at *50.
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situations in which majority shareholders had wronged minority shareholders.47
Because LifeMed, LLC, had no majority member, the Anderson decision did not
apply, and the defendant had no fiduciary duty to the other members of the LLC.48
Instead, the court stated that the case at bar resembled McGee in that it involved
nothing more than “uncomplicated contractual duties under an operating agreement
and a management agreement.”49
III. INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
If the ARC Lifemed court’s ruling regarding the duty owed by members of a
Tennessee LLC to other LLC members were the only, or even the most significant,
issue implicated, the case, while interesting, would be simply another appellate court
case upholding Tennessee precedent. However, the most significant issue implicated
by the ARC Lifemed case concerns choice of law, an issue not readily apparent to one
not specifically looking for it. Couched within the opinion, and seemingly glossed
over by the appellate court, is the fact that LifeMed, LLC, was organized under
Delaware law.50 Despite this “key fact,” the Tennessee Court of Appeals adjudicated
the case based on Tennessee statutory and case law.51
ARC Lifemed is not the first case in which a state has attempted to apply its
own law to entities organized in Delaware. In VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v.
Examen, Inc.,52 the Delaware Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether a
California statute53 provided shareholders with rights in addition to those provided
under Delaware law or whether the California statute preempted Delaware law.54
47 Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819, at *8-9 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003).
48

ARC Lifemed, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 460, at *50.

49

Id.

50

Id. at *33.

51

See, e.g., id. at *47-53.

52

871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005).

53 The California statute in question was section 2115 of the California Corporations Code, which
provides that the articles of incorporation of foreign corporations having contacts with California
must comply with California law, regardless of the foreign corporation’s state of incorporation. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 2115(a)-(b) (West 2006).
54

VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1112, 1114 & n.22.
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Examen provided legal expense management solutions throughout the United
States.55 Examen was contemplating a merger with LexisNexis, but the merger
required the approval of a majority of the holders of Examen common stock and
Series A Preferred stock, voting together as a single class.56 VantagePoint owned
approximately eighty-three percent Examen’s common stock and wanted a separate
class vote instead of the two classes voting together as one class because a separate
vote would have given VantagePoint the power to block the merger.57 VantagePoint
wanted the California statute to apply because its application would allow a separate
class vote, whereas the application of Delaware law would not.58
Examen filed a complaint in Delaware seeking a declaration that Delaware
law applied, while VantagePoint filed an action in California seeking “a declaration
that Examen was a quasi-California corporation…and therefore subject to”
California’s corporate law statutes.59 The California Superior Court stayed its action
to allow the Delaware court to rule on Examen’s choice of law action.60 The
Delaware Court of Chancery held that Delaware law governed, which meant that the
shareholder vote on the proposed merger of Examen and LexisNexis would entail
common stock and Series A Preferred Stock voting as a single class.61 VantagePoint
appealed the decision to the Delaware Supreme Court, which affirmed the Court of
Chancery.62
In ruling that only Delaware law applied in the VantagePoint case, the
Delaware Supreme Court invoked the internal affairs doctrine.63 Courts have long
accepted that the only state that should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s
55

Id. at 1110-11.

56

Id. at 1111.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 1109-10.

60

Id. at 1110.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 1109.

63

Id. at 1117-18.
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internal affairs is the state of incorporation.64 This principle, known as the “internal
affairs doctrine,” developed from the notion that in order to prevent corporations
from being subjected to inconsistent regulations from different states, the authority
to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs should reside with only one jurisdiction.65
The internal affairs doctrine protects the expectations of parties with an interest in a
corporation by providing a sense of certainty and predictability regarding the law that
will govern the corporation.66 Indeed, the uniform treatment of those associated
with a business entity is only possible if the laws of a single state govern the entity.67
Individuals that may be affected by the choice of laws applicable to a business entity
expect that the laws of the entity’s state of incorporation will govern, as this state is
easily identified.68 However, the internal affairs doctrine is more than merely a
conflict of laws principle. It also protects the right of business entity actors to know
which laws will govern their and the entity’s actions.69 This right to know which laws
will apply to a given situation is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the

64 See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (providing that “only one State should have
the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among
or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a
corporation could be faced with conflicting demands”); Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 130
(1933) (providing that “[i]t has long been settled doctrine that a court—state or federal—sitting in one
state will, as a general rule, decline to interfere with, or control by injunction or otherwise, the
management of the internal affairs of a corporation organized under the laws of another state but will
leave controversies as to such matters to the courts of the state of the domicile”).
65

See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645.

See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987). The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws posits that

66

[a]pplication of the local law of the state of incorporation will usually be supported
by those choice-of-law factors favoring the needs of the interstate…system[ ],
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, protection of the justified
expectations of the parties and ease in the application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. e (2005).
67

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. e (2005).

68

Id.

69

VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 2005).
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Fourteenth Amendment.70 The internal affairs doctrine is now a well established
doctrine that is recognized by both federal and state courts.71
In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,72 a Delaware corporation initiated a cash tender offer
for all of the outstanding shares of an Illinois corporation.73 MITE Corp., the
offeror, had not registered the offer with the Illinois Secretary of State as required by
Illinois statute mandating registration of any takeover offer for the shares of an
Illinois target corporation.74 On the same day that MITE Corp. initiated the tender
offer, it also commenced litigation to challenge the registration requirement.75 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, finding that the
Illinois statute in question was “a substantial burden on interstate commerce” and,
thus, “invalid under the Commerce Clause.”76 The Illinois Secretary of State raised
the internal affairs doctrine issue, arguing that because the tender offer occurred in
Illinois, the Court should apply the internal affairs doctrine and hold that Illinois law
governs the transaction.77 The United States Supreme Court stated that, because the
Illinois statute applied not only to transactions involving Illinois corporations but
also to transactions in which ten percent of the target corporation’s shares are held

70

Id. The Due Process Clause provides in part that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
645 (1982); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 208-09 (Del. 1987).

71

72

475 U.S. 624 (1982).

73

Id. at 626-27.

74

Id. at 626-28.

75

Id. at 628.

76

Id. at 646.

77

Id. at 645.
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by Illinois residents, regardless of the target company’s state of incorporation, the
internal affairs doctrine could not apply to the statute.78
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,79 Dynamics Corp., which was attempting to
acquire a significant amount of CTS Corp. stock, challenged the validity of a segment
of the Indiana Business Corporation Law,80 alleging that the federal Williams Act81
preempted the Indiana Act.82 The District Court found in favor of Dynamics Corp.,
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.83 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
two lower courts, stating that the Williams Act did not preempt the Indiana Act84
and reiterating that “[i]t…is an accepted part of the business landscape…for States
to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are
acquired by purchasing their shares.”85 The Court went on to state one of the most
important rationales underlying the internal affairs doctrine, namely, to “promot[e]
stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations [a state] charters.”86
In McDermott Inc. v. Lewis,87 upon which the VantagePoint court relied heavily,88
the Delaware Supreme Court applied the internal affairs doctrine in deciding that
78

Id.

79

481 U.S. 69 (1987).

80

IND. CODE §§ 23-1-17-1 et seq. (2005).

81

15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2005).

82

CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 75.

83

Id. at 76.

Id. at 86. The Court opined that “[t]he longstanding prevalence of state regulation in this area
suggests that, if Congress had intended to pre-empt all state laws that delay the acquisition of voting
control following a tender offer, it would have said so explicitly” and that “[t]he regulatory conditions
that the [Indiana] Act places on tender offers are consistent with the text and the purposes of the
Williams Act.” Id. at 86.
84

85

Id. at 91.

86

Id.

87

531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987).

88

VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1110-16 (Del. 2005).
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Panamanian law governed a Delaware company’s voting of its shares in a
Panamanian corporation.89 In McDermott, a Delaware subsidiary of a Panamanian
corporation wanted to vote its shares in the parent company in a way prohibited by
Delaware law.90 The plaintiffs filed suit to rescind the reorganization under which
McDermott Delaware became a subsidiary of McDermott International (the
Panamanian company).91 The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that
Panama would not apply its laws to the facts of the case.92 On appeal, the Delaware
Supreme Court reversed based on the fact that there was no relationship between
McDermott International and the State of Delaware and because the issues raised by
the plaintiffs did not involve the internal affairs of McDermott Delaware.93
Therefore, based on the internal affairs doctrine, Panamanian law applied to the
manner of voting shares in McDermott International; thus, McDermott Delaware
was allowed to vote its shares in the parent company in a manner prohibited by
Delaware law.94
Quoting from McDermott, the VantagePoint court noted that the application of
“local internal affairs law…to a foreign corporation is ‘apt to produce inequalities,
intolerable confusion, and uncertainty, and intrude into the domain of other states
that have a superior claim to regulate the same subject matter.’”95 To avoid these
potential problems, the VantagePoint court followed Delaware precedent and applied
the internal affairs doctrine.96 The internal affairs doctrine was relevant in
VantagePoint because the controversy being adjudicated clearly involved the
relationship of a corporation to its shareholders.97 It was this relationship between
89

McDermott Inc., 531 A.2d at 208-09.

90

Id. at 208.

91

Id. at 209.

92

Id. at 209, 212.

93

Id. at 209.

94

Id. at 209, 219.

VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1114 (Del. 2005) (quoting
McDermott, 531 A.2d at 216).
95

96

Id. at 1116.

97

Id. at 1115-16.
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the shareholders, some of whom lived in Delaware, and Examen, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, that demanded that the internal affairs doctrine deem Delaware law
controlling.98
Notwithstanding the Tennessee Court of Appeals’ decision in ARC Lifemed,
in the past, Tennessee courts have applied the internal affairs doctrine. In Bayberry
Associates v. Jones,99 the Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled that Maryland corporate
law applied to litigation involving a Maryland corporation.100 In Bayberry, Comdata
was a Maryland corporation with its principal place of business in Tennessee.101
After attempts to negotiate a merger with more than one company, Comdata finally
reached a tentative agreement to merge with Welch, Carson, Anderson & Stowe IV,
a New York limited partnership. Bayberry, a New Jersey limited partnership that
owned a large amount of Comdata stock, filed a class action suit in Tennessee,
seeking damages and an injunction to prevent the merger.102 In deciding the case,
the Tennessee Court of Appeals was first required to determine which state’s law
would apply.103 The court interpreted the internal affairs doctrine as requiring that
“[c]laims involving the ‘internal affairs’ of a corporation should be resolved in
accordance with the law of the state of incorporation.”104 The Court also looked to
the Tennessee corporation statutes, which contain a provision addressing the internal
affairs doctrine.105 The court concluded that, by enacting legislation that codifies the
internal affairs doctrine, the Tennessee legislature “implicitly recognized and
approved the internal affairs doctrine as a choice of law rule for Tennessee.”106
98

Id. at 1116.

99

1988 WL 137181 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1988).

100

Id. at *4.

101

Id. at *1.

102

Id.

103

Id. at *4-5.

104

Id. at *4.

105 Id. at *4-5. The Tennessee Code provides that “[c]hapters 11-27 of this title do not authorize this
state to regulate the organization or internal affairs of a foreign corporation authorized to transact
business in this state.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-25-105(c) (2005).
106

Bayberry, 1988 WL 137181, at *5.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF ARC LIFEMED V. AMC-TENNESSEE
Both Tennessee case law and Tennessee statutory law clearly indicate that,
under the internal affairs doctrine, Tennessee courts should apply the corporate law
of the state under which a business entity that is a party to litigation is
incorporated.107 The ARC Lifemed court, however, applied Tennessee LLC law to an
LLC organized in Delaware.108 The Tennessee Court of Appeals’ failure to apply the
widely recognized and often-applied internal affairs doctrine is likely due to the fact
that neither party in the ARC Lifemed case sought the application of Delaware law, as
the court made no mention of either party raising the choice of law issue. It is
possible that both parties’ attorneys examined Delaware law and neither concluded
that the use of Tennessee law would be disadvantageous or would lead to a result
different from the result that would be obtained under Delaware law. In any case,
attorneys representing business entities in litigation in Tennessee courts should be
mindful of the state in which the entities they represent are incorporated. This
information will allow attorneys to include the choice of law issue implicating the
internal affairs doctrine in their complaints or answers to complaints, as the case may
be.

107

See id. at *4-5; § 48-25-105(c).

108 See ARC Lifemed, Inc. v. AMC-Tennessee, Inc., No. M2003-02640-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 460, at *47-53 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2005).

